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In contrast to many studies that link the weakening of human rights to the post-September 11
th 
counter-terrorism policies, this paper seeks to attribute it to the gradual disappearance of the 
person as subject of rights in contemporary legal systems. It argues that this vanishing legal 
personhood is not the side-effect, but the natural outcome of the prevalence of the risk-focused 
mindset in both the crime control and the human rights realm since the late 1970s. To present 
this argument, it describes briefly the key features of the risk-focused mindset in order to show 
how they jeopardise or even negate personhood, and how they correlate with certain deep 
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SECURITY, RISK AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 
A VANISHING RELATIONSHIP? 




Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, on New York and Washington, of 11 
March 2004, on Madrid, and of 7 July 2005, on London, as well as several terrorist attacks 
against Western people and interests in usually non-Western countries,
1 an array of new 
counterterrorism laws and regulatory texts has been enacted in Europe both at national and EU 
level. In their attempt to counter what was perceived to be a major threat to European security, 
these texts often introduced provisions and even parallel legal frameworks that have entailed 
serious restrictions on the civil rights and liberties of European populations.  
The increasing infringement of human rights in the name of the efficient fight against terrorism 
has rapidly drawn the attention of many scholars, who, in analysing certain legal and political 
questions related to the issue, denounced the introduction in European legal systems of a quasi- 
permanent state of exception (Waldron, 2003; Haubrich, 2003; Sarafianos & Tsaitouridis, 2004; 
Gearty, 2005b; Balzacq & Carrera, 2006; Starmer, 2007). While some jurists and political 
scientists sought to explain this tendency by analysing the nature of states of emergency and the 
relationship between the rule of law and politics in a democracy (Guild, 2003a, 2003b; Bigo, 
2007; Tushnet, 2007; O’Cinneide, 2007; Lynch, 2007; Sands, 2007; Ewing, 2007), other 
academics broadened the scope of their analysis to question, on the one hand, the frame and the 
grounds of the protection of human rights in present liberal democracies and, on the other hand, 
the effects of counterterrorism on social groups and policies that are a priori unrelated to 
terrorism. The former sought to analyse the protection of human rights and the challenges posed 
on their normative foundations and on their political usefulness in light of the changes that have 
occurred in the post-bipolar political agenda (Gearty, 2005a; Dembour, 2006); the latter focused 
on the dynamics of a rapidly expanding suspicion and studied the impact of the new 
counterterrorism policies on illegal migrants and asylum seekers (Brouwer et al., 2003; 
Baldaccini & Guild, 2006).  
Other scholars have focused on the way public discourses on terrorism framed the threat and 
structured the arguments in favour of the introduction of new, liberty-restrictive 
counterterrorism policies both in Europe and the US (Johnson, 2002; Lewis, 2002; Steinert, 
2003; Graham et al., 2004; Lazar & Lazar, 2004; Leudar et al., 2004; Hodges & Nilep, 2007; 
Merola, 2008). They showed that the legitimisation of the increasing infringement of human 
rights was being established in the name of the efficient protection of public safety and national 
security, and was mainly resting upon the idea of a balance to be struck between security and 
liberty (Waldron, 2003; Starmer, 2007). Yet, as analysis of many relevant political discourses 
has revealed (Tsoukala, 2004, 2006a, 2006b), this idea in turn rests upon a highly controversial 
interpretation of the status and place of freedom in the European legal systems, according to 
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which freedom ceases to be the condition sine qua non of liberal democracies, the matrix from 
which stem all rights in a democracy, to be turned into an ordinary right. Once included among 
the many different social values that have to be protected by the law, it may be subject to the 
arbitration that usually occurs in the case of a conflict between two equal rights, and thereby can 
be in part sacrificed for the sake of its allegedly opposed right, that is, security.   
This political and legal downgrading of freedom has been further reinforced by the powerful 
dissemination in the public arena of a definition of the concept that frames it in negative rather 
than positive terms (Tsoukala, 2006a, 2009). According to this scheme, terrorism is not seen as 
a threat posed to people endowed with free will in democracy but as a threat from which people 
have to set themselves free in order to enjoy their rights. Political discourses on freedom and 
human rights are thus turned into discourses on fear (Robin, 2004; Altheide, 2006) in front of a 
grave situation that requires the introduction of all appropriate measures, even freedom-
restricting ones, if these are believed to counter the threat. In other words, far from referring to 
civil rights and liberties, ‘freedom’ legitimates the very restriction of these civil rights and 
liberties. People are then expected to accept these restrictions in the name of protection of their 
freedom from fear. 
Further analysis of many different political discourses on the definition of the terrorist threat in 
the post-September 11
th era (Tsoukala, 2008a, 2008b, 2009) has revealed that the framing and 
broadcasting of its core elements had been closely linked to an array of domestic political and 
bureaucratic interests that were deeply embedded in the functioning of the political and security 
fields of a given country. Moreover, the findings of past research show that the representation of 
the terrorist threat in many different European countries has also varied significantly according 
to the importance attached by governments to certain important geopolitical issues, which are 
usually irrelevant to terrorism (Tsoukala, 2009).  
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the intrinsic quality of the aforementioned analyses, in most 
cases their findings remain somewhat misleading in that they are explicitly or implicitly linked 
to the present counterterrorism policies. In this respect, although they do not forcibly share the 
prevailing view of the newness of the terrorist threat, many of them end up sharing the idea of a 
key turning point in the elaboration of security policies and in the ensuing tension between 
liberty and security in Europe. In so doing, they rightly stress the importance of the changes that 
have occurred in the security policy realm since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, but 
they wrongly perceive them solely in terms of discontinuity and rupture. In other words, while 
the analyses of the forms taken by the present counterterrorism policies and their impact on 
human rights pertinently focus on the web of interactions between politicians, security 
professionals, the media and civil society in order to grasp the evolving relationship between 
politics and the rule of law, they usually fail to highlight the continuities that lie beneath present 
and past security policies.
2  
Only recently have some studies sought to shed light on these continuities following two 
different angles. In the former case, the growing infringement of human rights is dissociated 
from the post-September 11
th counterterrorism policies, to be related to the professional routines 
and practices of a vast array of public and private security agents, who, in constantly reinforcing 
their multilateral collaborations since the late 20
th century, have come to form a solidly 
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constituted security field both at national and transnational level (Bigo, 2007; Bigo & Tsoukala, 
2008). In another attempt to address the issue, through the analysis of the evolution of the social 
control of a specific criminal behaviour since the late 1960s, the present restrictions on human 
rights are seen as one of the effects of the profound changes that have taken place in the 
criminal justice field since the late 1970s. Far from being transient and fragmentary, they are 
inherent to the structure and operational logic of the currently prevailing risk-focused crime-
control model, thereby signalling a gradual erosion of civil liberties which, quite simply, has 
spread and gathered pace since the terrorist attacks that took place at the beginning of the 21
st 
century (Tsoukala, 2008c).  
Yet, despite their pioneering character, the above-mentioned studies still do not address what 
arguably is one of the key aspects of the issue. In focusing either on the security field effect or 
the crime-control policy effect, they both tend to explain restrictions on human rights through 
analysis of various factors that may have impacted on them. In all cases, the rationale behind 
these studies attributes the increasing infringement of human rights in modern liberal 
democracies to the adverse effect exerted on their scope by an array of social and political 
processes. In other words, in spite of their different explanatory frameworks, both of these 
theses adopt a rights-focused approach.  
While endorsing these theses, which to some extent can be seen as complementary, this paper 
will address the issue from a different angle that focuses instead on the place of people within 
the presently prevailing risk-based security policies. It will seek to attribute the weakening of 
human rights to the gradual disappearance of the person as a subject of rights in our 
contemporary legal systems. It will argue that this vanishing legal personhood is not the side-
effect but the natural outcome of the prevalence of the risk-focused mindset in both the crime-
control and the human rights realms. To present this argument, it will describe briefly the key 
features of the risk-focused mindset in order to show how they jeopardise or even negate 
personhood, and how they correlate with certain deep changes in the legal framework of the 
protection of human rights in a democracy. 
1.  Risk and crime control 
One of the key changes that have taken place in the criminal justice realm since the late 20
th 
century is the transition from a rehabilitation-oriented crime-control model to a risk-focused 
one. The former, which was prevailing from the 19
th century till the late 1970s,
3 was seeking to 
protect the community from the danger produced by an offence by centring on the subjective 
aspects of the offence, that is, the motive and needs of the offender. Clearly circumscribed in 
time and space, the reaction of the criminal justice system would manifest itself after a person 
had breached the sphere of legality, to restore order and social peace. Punishment would then 
usually seek to attain a threefold objective, that is, a retributive, a dissuasive and a rehabilitative 
one. Although this crime-control model did not exclude the control of deviant behaviour, this 
was somehow seen as the expression of a form of social control that veered off course, usually 
related to the ordinary work of law enforcers and tolerated as long as it did not extend beyond 
some conventionally accepted limits.  
The rationale behind this crime-control model rested upon the assumption that individuals were 
indissociable from their community, and vice versa. So, it was admitted that the community had 
to moderate its exclusionary force towards individuals who had departed from the legal norm 
(Garland, 1985; Mary, 2003), and impose on them both exclusionary and inclusionary 
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mechanisms in order to allow them to reintegrate into the mainstream society. As the State was 
seeking both to preserve its authority, by exerting legal violence upon its citizens, and to ensure 
social cohesion, criminal law was resting upon a prudent articulation between the wish to punish 
and the need to forgive (Salas, 2008: 15). Consequently, while punishing the individual offence, 
this crime-control model also looked to the future by seeking rehabilitation at the individual 
level and prevention at the collective one. In the former case, the widespread belief in the 
reforming capacities of disciplinary power over the ‘undisciplined’ incarcerated criminals 
(Foucault, 1975) led to the rapid spread, throughout the post-war years, of rehabilitation policies 
for prisoners. At the collective level, the acceptance of a causal link between crime and society 
led to many studies of the crime-generating social milieu (Sellin, 1938; Cohen, 1955; Merton, 
1957; Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; Sutherland & Cressey, 1960; Szabo, 1965; Shaw & McKay, 
1969) and, consequently, to the establishment of many long-term social prevention 
programmes. 
However, from the mid-1970s onwards, the neo-conservative rejection of the rehabilitation-
oriented crime-control model as inefficient (Martinson, 1974) and the rising calls for a new, 
realistic policy, which, far from paying attention to the crime-generating social environment, 
would be merely centred on the idea of controlling the social effects of crime (Wilson, 1975), 
led to the introduction and subsequent development in all Western countries of a crime-control 
model that aimed at defending the mainstream society from crime by managing in advance any 
relevant risk.  
The objective of crime control is thus radically modified (Feeley & Simon, 1992; Simon, 1997; 
Ericson & Haggerty, 1997; Shearing, 2001; Johnston & Shearing, 2003; Feeley, 2003; 
Hörnqvist, 2004). In sharp contrast to past policies, social control agents are no longer seeking 
to defend the community against a danger posed by the commission of an offence but to protect 
it from the potential risk inherent in a given behaviour. The harm that stirs up the criminal 
justice system does not stem then from a specific misdeed but from a vague fear, a feeling of 
insecurity aroused by behaviour deemed to endanger the well-being of the community (Salas, 
2008: 17).  
Since the former objective assessment of the perpetrated harm is replaced by subjective 
assessments of possibly risk-producing situations, the target of social control shifts from the 
individual offenders to the members of deviant, ‘risk-producing’ groups, who are controlled on 
the ground of being suspects, in the present time, and potential offenders, in the future. From 
now onwards, instead of seeking to normalize undisciplined people according to a prefixed 
range of socially desirable behaviours, in order to have them at some moment reintegrated into 
the mainstream society, the social control apparatus aims at regulating spaces and populations in 
the Foucaldian sense of the term (Foucault, 1997: 213ff). 
In detaching itself from the offence and seeking to identify sources of risk in order to anticipate 
the commission of future misdeeds, social control also becomes increasingly proactive. It rests 
then upon a vast array of surveillance and control mechanisms that manage crime control by 
profiling suspects according to usual actuarial risk-assessment criteria (Silver & Miller, 2002). 
In line both with the general concern about risk in post-modern societies (Beck, 1992, 1999) and 
the growing impact of technology on the design and implementation of surveillance 
mechanisms, the storage of such profiles in many different (trans)national police databases is 
nowadays a commonplace in the everyday and strategic management of internal security issues. 
The ensuing establishment of a vast control of deviant behaviour that, in some cases, leads even 
to the direct punishment of suspects,
4 and the underlying transformation of the relationship 
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between politics and the rule of law have been frequently criticised in academia (Lyon, 1994, 
2001; Norris et al., 1998; Jones, 2000; Dillon, 2003; Graham & Wood, 2003; Bonditti, 2004; 
Webster, 2004; Ceyhan, 2007). Usually framed in quantitative terms, one of the key arguments 
of these criticisms relates the threat thus posed on civil liberties to the present technological 
progress that allows intelligence gathering to reach unprecedented dimensions both in the size 
and the inter-connectability of the collected data (Geyer, 2008). Only recently have some 
studies pointed out that the control of deviance thus entailed is also qualitatively different from 
any of its previous forms because, to the extent that it is provided by the law, it ceases to be a 
marginal form of social control and becomes fully institutionalised (Tsoukala, 2007, 2009). 
It should be noted at this point that, however pervasive it may be, the spread of this risk-oriented 
crime-control model did not result in the abandonment of the previous crime-control policy but, 
as usually happens in similar cases, in an evolving form of co-existence (Johnston & Shearing, 
2003: 133ff). In commenting on the rising populism within the criminal justice system, John 
Pratt pertinently summarised this process by saying that penal thought and strategies are usually 
submitted to a range of competing and conflicting influences at any given time, rather than the 
supreme dominance of any of them because they are marked by fluidity and overlap rather than 
rigid compartmentalisation (2007: 125-8). In the specific case of the competing crime-control 
models, the development of the risk-focused crime-control policies led of course to the 
introduction of new measures but, above all, allocated new meanings to existing approaches and 
practices to make them consistent with the risk-based way of thinking (Shearing, 2001: 212). 
Therefore, while, formally speaking, certain measures are still based on the earlier crime-control 
model and others follow the risk-focused one, the risk-based mindset has in fact been gradually 
taking over (Hörnqvist, 2004: 39).  
2.  Risk, crime control, and personhood 
The issue of whether, and to what extent, the aforementioned changes in the objective and target 
of social control, and the introduction of new elements in the crime-control management 
following the risk-focused mindset have entailed a profound alteration of the place held by 
persons in the criminal justice realm, cannot be addressed without defining the key features of 
personhood that may be relevant in this respect. Indeed, what personal identity consists of and 
how individuals may be perceived in their relationship with the others has been a longstanding 
matter of discussion within philosophical circles (Martin & Barresi, 2006). For the needs of the 
present paper, it would suffice to define the issue following a twofold criterion, that is, material 
and intellectual. It is therefore considered that persons have a material substance, as any living 
being, inscribed in time and space, and develop a dialectical relationship with their environment, 
be it natural or social, in order to satisfy their own needs and desires and achieve their goals. 
Persons are further seen as endowed with reason, self-awareness and free will. In the field of 
law, the latter elements imply that they may have a legal capacity, that is, be subject of rights, 
duties and obligations.  
While the rationale behind the rehabilitation-oriented crime-control model is entirely consistent 
with the aforementioned key features of personhood, thereby guaranteeing the stability of a 
certain legal personhood as well, the conceptual frame underlying the risk-focused crime-
control policies seems, in many respects, to devalue or even negate some of these 
characteristics.   
2.1  Denial of the individual  
First of all, in shifting attention from the effectively delinquent person to the deviant, potentially 
risk-producing group, the risk-focused crime-control model is no longer placing the person at 6 | ANASTASSIA TSOUKALA 
 
the core of the criminal justice system. The social control apparatus is no longer targeting 
individuals, that is, persons who are deemed to be socially dangerous because of their unique 
behaviour, but members of groups, that is, persons who are seen as threatening precisely 
because they share certain common features with other persons.  
In this new configuration, the more a person’s features tend to be essentially perceived and 
interpreted in connection with a series of parameters related to other persons and situations, the 
more the person is likely to draw the attention of social control agents. In other words, the 
inclusion of a person into the criminal justice system is not done in the name of what makes the 
person distinct from all the other members of the community; on the contrary, the relevant 
decision is to a great extent determined by the absence of such a unicity. In the UK, sexual 
offenders thus came to be seen as ‘a homogeneous group, not differentiated by offence, risk, or 
individual circumstance’ (Rutherford, 2007: 67). North African youth living in disadvantaged 
French suburbs may have their data entered in police databases, as suspects for urban riots and 
petty crime, if they meet with certain criteria, such as spending time in specific public places, 
meeting regularly certain peer groups and sharing with them specific forms of leisure, and so on 
(Muchielli, 2001: 40ff; Bonelli, 2008a: 399-402). English football supporters may be profiled as 
suspects for football-related violence if they are known to keep the company of football 
hooligans (Armstrong & Hobbs, 1994: 225) or if ‘they regularly form part of a risk group’ and 
‘seem to be frequently in the vicinity of disorder’ (statement of a senior intelligence officer, 
quoted by Perryman, 2006: 210), while the Italian government is considering the introduction of 
an order to fingerprint all Roma children living in Italy (La Repubblica, 26 June 2008). 
2.2  Denial of the individual in society  
In putting forward this impersonal, group-oriented objective, risk-focused social control further 
dismisses all crime-producing factors related to the motives and the ensuing guilt of the 
offender, to deal only with the effects of socially undesirable behaviours. This shift of attention 
from the causes to the symptoms of crime wipes away the offender in three respects. Firstly, 
notwithstanding the cases where the dangerousness of the delinquent personality is attributed to 
a pathological state,
5 the elements that usually make up one’s personality and underlie one’s 
decision as regards the engagement in crime are not taken into account. All psychological 
factors that may facilitate or, on the contrary, impede the commission of an offence are thus 
disregarded.  
This marginalisation of the individual personality goes hand in hand with the implicit divorcing 
of the offender from the mainstream society. While the rehabilitation-oriented crime-control 
model was linking individuals to their community in two ways, that is, in correlating the 
engagement in crime to a given social milieu and in admitting that the optimal development of 
the community could only be achieved with the participation of as many of its members as 
possible, the risk-focused crime-control model refuses to admit the pertinence of these bonds. 
Therefore, the question of whether and up to what extent the mainstream society may be seen as 
one of the potential sources of crime, due to the combined influence of an array of political, 
social, economic, cultural and demographic reasons, is not raised. Following the same 
reasoning, the development of the community can henceforth be conceived in most 
advantageous terms even without the participation of those members, who, at some moment in 
the past, had veered off course.  
This way of perceiving the position of individuals in a society has had a double impact on the 
design of crime-control policies. Since individual behaviour is no more seen as reflecting in part 
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the structure and functioning of a living-together state, long-term preventive programmes are 
gradually being marginalized for the benefit of situational prevention and proactive approaches. 
Accordingly, since the involvement of a maximum of citizens in the making of social life is no 
more seen as one of the preconditions of the successful achievement of collective goals, 
rehabilitation of prisoners’ programmes are increasingly being abandoned (Mary, 2003: 32ff; 
Salas, 2008: 106ff).  
The latter point highlights the impact of risk-focused crime-control policies on punishment and 
especially on imprisonment. From the very moment punishment does not seek to rehabilitate an 
offender but to protect real or imaginary victims from an effectively or hypothetically 
threatening behaviour, it remains confined in its retributive and dissuasive functions, thus 
becoming indifferent to the prisoner’s future. Therefore, the decision of whether a prisoner 
should be released or not does not depend on the degree of seriousness of the harm caused in the 
past but on the assessment of the risk he or she may still represent for the others. Punishment 
may then become boundless in time and space, as is clearly shown by the community 
notification legislation introduced in many countries with regard to sexual offenders, or by the 
adoption of indeterminate sentences, imposed after the expiration of the initial punishment upon 
persons deemed to remain somewhat socially threatening.
6 Punishment may also go beyond the 
frame of the ordinary, impersonal, judicial procedure and become emotion-driven,
7 as is 
revealed by the practice of introducing the victims in the process of determining parole for 
offenders (Pratt, 2007: 136; Salas, 2008: 181ff).  
2.3  Denial of free will 
The place accorded to the person in the criminal justice system is further weakened by the 
prevalence of a proactive, anticipatory pattern of action in the risk-based crime-control policies. 
While, as will be developed below, the wish to manage future risks wipes away all prior 
distinction between criminal and deviant behaviour, the shift from the individual offender to the 
deviant, ‘risk-producing’ group jeopardises most of the individual-based principles related to 
the definition and the punishment of offences.  
The first principle to be thus endangered is the presumption of innocence. In the incremental 
surveillance mechanisms applied to many different categories of people believed to be 
threatening for security, a person is no longer deemed to be innocent till proven guilty. The 
social control apparatus has no more to justify its action in the name of the transgression of a 
legal norm. Nor is it confined in the search of evidence of guilt. It can be set in motion and 
produce formally legal effects on the mere ground of suspicion. The Europol Computer System 
thus has information on possible future offenders; administrative football bans, currently 
introduced in many European countries, entail serious restrictions on the freedom of movement 
of football supporters who are simply suspected of being involved in football-related violence; 
in the name of the safety of air travels, passenger name record (PNR) databases contain a 
significant amount of personal data of all passengers travelling to the United States, which is 
transferred to a broad range of law enforcement agents, while a similar scheme is to be applied 
soon to every passenger travelling to and from the European Union (European Commission, 
2007).  
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The vanishing of the offence as the justificatory basis of the setting in motion of the criminal 
justice system further calls into question the principle of legality. Penalties may thus be imposed 
even in the absence of a conviction, as shown in the case of certain suspects for terrorism in the 
UK, who are subject to a control order
8 if there is insufficient legally admissible evidence. This 
institutionalisation of penalties on the ground of suspicion leads in turn to the disregard of the 
principle of the criminal liability. The target of social control is no more defined according to an 
array of legally defined links between the person and the punishable act. Risk-persons are 
defined following an array of allegedly relevant information and traces that may end up 
establishing guilt but may as well remain in an in-between state. In the latter case, the moral 
assessment of the punishable act as the ground of the liability that entails punishment is 
irrelevant. Quite unsurprisingly then, as Clifford Shearing has rightly noticed (2001: 208), the 
relation between offender and individual or collective victim that used to be at the core of the 
rationale behind punishment is now waning.  
The institutionalisation of penalties on the ground of suspicion further entails the weakening of 
the principle of their proportionality and the dismissing of the principles of their personal and 
individual character. While the latter become meaningless when punishment is imposed as an 
answer to behaviour rather than specific acts, the former is becoming somewhat loose. As a 
matter of fact, in the absence of an offence, that is, in the absence of an assessable act according 
to legally defined criteria, the ground upon which may possibly rest the assessment of the 
proportionality of the punishment of a certain behaviour becomes floating. Legal certainty is 
thus diminished and, to the extent that such forms of punishment may be imposed by non- 
judicial agents, persons may even be de facto prevented from enjoying the guarantees offered by 
the judicial procedure.  
Being the direct effect of the proactive pattern of action of the risk-focused crime-control 
model, this downgrading of the offence and the offence-related legal principles further unveils a 
profound change in the way social control agents perceive free will. As a matter of fact, their 
pretension to possess a kind of global knowledge of future behaviours denies the freedom to 
decide whether, and under what circumstances, a person will commit a given act. Persons are 
thus reduced to predictable systems of behaviour, the efficient monitoring of which cannot but 
prevent them from taking certain expectable forms. Their personhood, which is deemed to be 
reproduced through the analysis of an array of allegedly relevant collected data, their future 
decisions and actions are therefore taken for granted.  
Yet, as David Lyon has rightly noticed (2001), surveillance creates an illusion of knowledge 
over unreal people. Data gathering for crime-control purposes actually rests upon the 
aggregation of disparate pieces of information, which are seen as unable to make sense unless 
they are related to each other (Froment, 2006). Once collected, this data may be interconnected 
with other (dis)similar data preserved in other databases, be they intelligence, law enforcement, 
commercial, or health ones, thus creating a digital persona, composed out of these fragmented 
pieces of information. Henceforth, it is this selectively fragmented, deprived of consciousness 
and sociality digital persona that will be seen as a representation of the subject to be put under 
control, arrested and probably punished.  
In this highly predetermined frame of possible human action, free will is logically disregarded, 
as an element likely to introduce disorder in what seeks to produce an orderly image of social 
life. Far from being a side-effect of the functioning of the social control apparatus, this 
exclusion is fully consistent with the key features of the risk-focused mindset. The intrinsic 
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unpredictability of free will makes it incompatible with the predictability that lies beneath the 
risk-focused surveillance and control mechanisms. In other words, free will has to be 
disregarded because the pretension of the social control agents to control and even punish 
people in the name of their capacity to foresee the future behaviour of these people can no more 
be seen as based on a reasonable ground unless it is admitted that human behaviour does not 
remain in fine unpredictable.   
2.4  Denial of the time-space dimension 
The place of persons in the risk-focused crime-control model is further weakened due to the 
way social control agents inscribe their operations in time and space. Actually, in adopting an 
anticipatory pattern of action, the social control apparatus dismisses the control of persons 
living in the time-space dimension of real life to privilege the control of flows of population that 
are somewhat floating in time and space.  
While the time dimension is distorted by the introduction of many different proactive measures 
that are set up before the commission of the harmful act and, therefore, end up moulding the 
future (Johnston & Shearing, 2003: 122ff; Ericson, 2007), the space dimension is warped by the 
spread of an array of remote control devices and mechanisms. Anti-social behaviour legislation 
thus enables ‘preemption of every imaginable source of disruption to domestic security’ 
(Ericson, 2007: 200), CCTV cameras introduce various spaces of control,
9 whereas border 
controls of the EU countries are increasingly exerted in an array of homocentric geographic 
circles that go well beyond the European borderlines and, in some cases, even expand in other 
continents (Bigo & Guild, 2003; Cuttita & Ragazzi, 2007).  
The shift from a definite post-offence time to a vague ante-risk-behaviour period and from a 
clear-cut space of control to a web of overlapping spaces of control eventually alters the relation 
of the risk-based social control with reality. To the extent that it focuses on potential rather than 
real behaviour, its effects are produced not only in the name of its links with reality but also in 
the name of its projection to a virtual reality. As Ulrich Beck has put it (2006), “risks are not 
‘real’, they are ‘becoming real’”. Therefore, in seeking to control undisciplined persons by 
managing in advance risk-producing groups, the behaviour of which is monitored thanks to a 
series of speculations on its future manifestation (Bigo, 2008a), social control agents end up 
operating in an essentially virtual time-space dimension.  
3.  Risk, persons and human rights 
This summary presentation of the relationship between the risk-based crime control and 
personhood clearly suggests that the former dismisses the temporally linear
10 and spatially 
definable rational frame of action of the unique, interior and autonomous person to privilege a 
predetermined array of actions of a figure, in the double sense of the term, that is, an outline of 
the person, and a serialised number. Such a figure can be included in a list of security threats, it 
                                                      
9 Surveillance by CCTV cameras involves at least two spaces of control, that is, the one that is actually 
controlled and the one where stands the controller. Yet this scheme only applies to the so-called proactive 
CCTV cameras, that is, these that are related to live surveillance. Most CCTV cameras are non-active and 
act only as visual deterrence that creates the illusion of surveillance – in which case, surveillance 
constructs a real and a virtual space of control. Other CCTV cameras may be reactive, allowing access to 
footage of incidents after the event has occurred – in which case, surveillance constructs two spaces of 
control that are not simultaneous. For an analysis of the typology of CCTV systems, see Webster (2004: 
234). 
10 That is, inscribed in a past-present-future sequence. 10 | ANASTASSIA TSOUKALA 
 
can be traced and filed in many different law enforcement databases, but arguably it cannot fully 
exist as the subject of rights.  
This assumption is actually grounded on the very nature of the links between personhood and 
legal personhood. When it refers to individuals, legal personhood consists of the virtual 
extension of a person in the legal domain.
11 It prolongs the capacities of a person – capacities 
that usually stem from the key features of personhood. It guarantees the person can enjoy certain 
legally defined rights – rights that emanate from personhood. Its very existence and 
development in a lifetime is closely related to that of the personhood it refers to. When some of 
the key features of personhood are deemed to be diminished
12 or when the person dies, legal 
personhood is accordingly limited or ceases to exist. It should be stressed, however, that these 
commonplaces for all jurists only correspond to the cases where legal personhood has to adapt 
itself to the biological and/or psychological state of the physical person of reference.  
What happens then to legal personhood when personhood is modified not by any extra-legal 
factor but by the legal system itself? To what extent can legal personhood resist the legal 
downgrading or even negation of some of the key features of personhood? Given the 
indissociable nature of the two concepts, it is not unreasonable to presume that, mutatis 
mutandis, this internal contradiction will entail a substantial alteration of legal personhood. As 
will be shown in the remainder of this paper, the effects of this contradiction arguably gather 
momentum in the human rights realm, especially when they interact with certain profound 
changes induced by the risk-focused mindset in the legal system of protection of human rights.  
3.1  Change in the legal ground of the protection of human rights: The 
‘legal upgrading’ of the control of deviance 
The shift from the delinquent person to the ‘risk-producing’ group and the ensuing introduction 
of an anticipatory pattern of action has blurred in many respects the prior distinction between 
crime and deviance. The rationale that sources of risk may be identified in every aspect of 
human activity, ranging from delinquent to deviant and even ordinary behaviour, produces a 
continuum of control (Feeley & Simon, 1992: 459) that encompasses indistinctly all types of 
behaviour. For example, CCTV cameras installed in football stadia monitor the behaviour of 
troublemakers, rowdy football supporters and ordinary football fans alike, while the collection 
and exchange of intelligence in case of international tournaments extend well beyond known 
and potential troublemakers to include even ordinary football supporters wishing to attend these 
sports events. 
As mentioned above, this control of deviance is new not only in quantitative terms but also, and 
above all, in qualitative terms. Indeed, while its expansion has reached unprecedented 
dimensions due to the combined effect of an incremental technological progress and the 
widening of the field of action of the law enforcement agents, the fact that this expansion is now 
provided by the law entails what has been qualified elsewhere as ‘legal upgrading’ of the 
control of deviance (Tsoukala, 2008c). From the moment the control of deviant behaviour is 
included in normative texts, it ceases to be a form of social control that has veered off course. It 
is no longer simply the marginal manifestation of an excess of power on the part of the law 
                                                      
11 As Yves Cartuyvels has observed (2006: 182), the idea of a subject of rights that is unique and equal in 
front of the law, that is, the construction of an abstract, free and responsible moral person corresponds to 
the promotion of a dual vision of the political society that entrusts the State to organise the common good, 
to share out and control the persons’ rights and obligations. 
12 As happens, for example, during childhood or in case of mental illness. SECURITY, RISK AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A VANISHING RELATIONSHIP? | 11 
 
enforcement agents. It becomes a key component of the legal system, fully consistent with the 
way in which crime-control policies actually operate.  
Its legal upgrading produces in turn a moral one. The control of deviance is no more a shameful 
aspect of the exercise of social control, an evidence of an undemocratic trend in the way the 
executive power restrains its force in the criminal justice realm. It is no longer an embarrassing 
shadow in security-related operations that, if ever denounced, requires justification, and calls for 
political and bureaucratic remedies. Its inclusion in law removes it from the dark operational 
facets of social control and brings it to light, like any other element of a legal norm. Far from 
being seen as outrageous, it is proposed as one among other normal expressions of the 
legislator’s will.  
The break with the past is so radical that it arguably calls into question the whole conception of 
the criminal justice system in a democracy. This institutionalisation of the control of deviance is 
so wide-ranging, both at national and EU level, that it can no longer be seen as a specific swing 
away from a liberal social control apparatus to one that is more authoritarian in orientation. It is 
no longer a question of occasional deviations by a criminal justice system that otherwise 
complies with the rule of law, a subject that was analysed at length in the 1980s (Delmas-Marty, 
1983: 102ff). While this new form of control confirms Stanley Cohen’s predictions (1985) 
about the establishment of an expanding and more intense control of deviance in our societies, it 
also goes beyond these predictions because the hold the social control apparatus increasingly 
exerts over the private sphere is now formally established and legitimised.  
3.2  Change in the value to be protected by law: From the individual to 
the group 
The issue of whether the normative foundations of human rights can possibly rest upon a 
universal basis remains a matter of debate among human rights experts (Gearty, 2005a; 
Dembour, 2006; Oberdorff, 2008; Griffin, 2008). Nevertheless, it is believed here that sharing 
this scepticism should not prevent us from assuming that human rights are primarily grounded 
on the values of personhood, and aim at protecting individual personhood (Griffin, 2008: 33ff).  
Though human rights violations in the criminal justice realm have not been unusual throughout 
the second half of the 20
th century, when committed in liberal regimes they were more often 
than not the result of the way the executive and occasionally the judicial power would perceive 
the rule of law and, consequently, would seek to modify for their own benefit the limits of their 
power in a given society (Tamanaha, 2004). In this respect, these violations were, above all, the 
symptom of an ongoing struggle for the (re)positioning of various agents in the political and 
security fields of a given country. Arguably then, they did not originate from any structural 
opposition between the guiding lines of the rehabilitation-oriented criminal justice system and 
the human rights-related principles.  
This compliance between criminal justice and human rights principles has however been 
gradually broken up following the rapid spread of the risk-focused crime-control model. These 
two legal systems are no more seeking to protect the same values. While the purpose of human 
rights law remains individual, that is, it focuses on the protection of every single person, the 
purpose of criminal justice becomes increasingly collective since it aims mainly at protecting 
society as a whole from risk-producing groups.  
This opposition creates in turn a form of contradiction that ends up hampering the efficiency of 
the legal protection of human rights. Actually, the shifting from the person to the group, as the 
key target of social control, and the ensuing dismissal in the criminal justice realm of many key 
features of personhood, cannot but weaken the scope of the protection of human rights to the 
extent that, due to its intrinsically individual nature, this protection becomes, in a certain way, 12 | ANASTASSIA TSOUKALA 
 
purposeless. People are being increasingly controlled, arrested and even punished in the name of 
a group- rather than person-based identity, while the protection of their rights is still grounded 
on their personal identity. These two legal systems do not fit into each other anymore; they 
defend antinomic values. As long then as the collective value of the risk-focused crime-control 
model prevails, it will logically hinder the development of its opposite value. Consequently, not 
only will it lead to the growing transgression of human rights in the criminal justice realm but 
also it will impede the efficient application of the legal protection of human rights that, 
henceforth, will be seen as counterproductive. Quite unsurprisingly then, apart from some 
extreme cases, where violations of human rights are still committed but formally denied,
13 these 
violations are justified and accepted as normal aspects of crime-control policies. Intrusive 
surveillance devices are therefore constantly being justified in the name of their efficiency to 
counter crime, while proactive measures that entail serious restrictions on civil rights and 
liberties are formally accepted because they are not considered as penalties.
14  
3.3  Change in the nature of the protection offered by the law: From 
impersonal principles to person-based approaches  
Though grounded on and oriented towards personhood, the political project on human rights 
and its subsequent transcription in law are conceived in terms of abstract principles. The 
protection they guarantee to any single person is legally and politically possible precisely 
because it is impersonal. From this point of view, their introduction and development in liberal 
democracies throughout the post-war period was to some extent consistent with the 
rehabilitation-oriented crime-control model. Because, as long as the criminal justice system was 
being mostly set in motion by the transgression of a legal norm, it too was impersonal. 
This impersonal approach is however no longer prevalent in the risk-focused crime-control 
model, which, on the contrary, is increasingly person-focused in that it frequently rests upon a 
series of profiling of human groups. The criminal justice system is now being set in motion not 
only by the transgression of a legal norm but also by the identification of risk-producing 
personalities regardless of the transgression of any legal norm. The fact that risk-producing 
personalities are defined in collective rather than individual terms does not alter the substance of 
the person-based approach that lies beneath this crime-control management. People are still 
controlled and arrested for what they are, or they are supposed to be, instead of what they do. 
                                                      
13 To this day, the most accurate example is the commonly known as US extraordinary rendition 
programme, the implementation of which rested upon the kidnapping and transfer of suspects for terrorist 
activities to countries with low standards of human rights’ protection, where they have been subject to 
torture or at least harsh interrogation techniques. On the forms and practices of denial with regard to 
torture and, generally, violations of human rights, see Cohen (2001). 
14 British and Belgian courts have thus ruled that administrative football bans do not entail a breach in 
human rights because, despite their punitive element, they are not penalties but preventative measures 
(Belgian Court of Arbitration, ruling 175/2002 of 5 December 2002; Laws LJ in Gough vs Chief 
Constable of Derbyshire, 2001, QBD; Court of Appeal in Gough vs Chief Constable of Derbyshire, 20 
March 2002). Following a similar reasoning, the French Constitutional Court ruled that the recent 
introduction in French law of the indeterminate detention of dangerous criminals, after the end of their 
initial sentence, is not violating human rights because it is not a penalty but a security measure (Ruling n° 
2008-562 DC of 21 February 2008). Analysis of these rulings would go well beyond the scope of this 
paper. Nevertheless, it should be reminded that the European Court of Human Rights has constantly 
stipulated that, in order to prevent the disciplinary from encroaching illegally on the criminal justice 
realm, punitive measures should be defined in law according to their effect (Delmas-Marty, 2002: 448ff).  SECURITY, RISK AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A VANISHING RELATIONSHIP? | 13 
 
Notwithstanding the probable discredit of the social control apparatus and the ensuing decline of 
trust in the impartiality of the criminal justice system, this transition from a principle-based to a 
person-based approach cannot but jeopardise the efficient protection of human rights. As long 
as the legislator remained impersonal in his way of managing social life, and was looking at 
persons only if they caused harm to society and to the extent they could be rehabilitated at some 
moment, the persons’ rights could be efficiently protected. All attempts made by the social 
control agents to deviate from these principles were seen as unlawful and, therefore, were likely 
to be denounced, formally rejected and even punished. From the moment the legislator became 
person-focused, seeking to mould in advance the personality of the people targeted so that they 
can never cause harm to society, the persons’ rights are being restricted. The person-based 
approach, which implies, among others, the institutionalisation of the control of deviance, 
denies or at least hampers the possibility to challenge the ensuing violations of the persons’ 
rights.  
Conclusion 
The argument that the present restrictions on human rights cannot be fully understood unless we 
take into account the impact on both personhood and legal personhood of the prevailing risk-
focused mindset in the criminal justice and human rights realms should not shift our attention 
away from the fact that this effect is indirectly enhanced by the place currently accorded to 
human rights by the political class.  
As shown elsewhere (Tsoukala, 2009), while losing part of their political interest in the post-
bipolar geopolitical context, human rights have also been subject to a downgrading process 
imposed by domestic politicians. The prevailing reframing of freedom in negative terms in the 
post-September 11
th security-related political discourses, and the ensuing dissemination of the 
idea of a balance to be struck between the henceforth taken-for-granted opposed values of 
liberty and security have had a double effect on human rights. On the one hand, they justified 
the introduction of liberty-restrictive laws and, therefore, legitimised highly controversial 
security policies. On the other hand, they established the idea that freedom is just one among 
other rights to be protected by law, thus altering the substance of the concept and, consequently, 
of its corollary, that is, human rights.  
Once included in this way in the political arena, human rights lose the ‘sacral’ status they had 
acquired in the post-war period (Warbrick, 2004: 999). They cease to be seen as indissociable 
from democracy, like the rule of law or the accountability principles,
15 and are being 
transformed into political tools, adjustable to the needs of the government of the day. Either 
then they can be totally dismissed
16 or temporarily suspended, as counter-productive, or they are 
restricted in the name of an allegedly superior value, that is, security. In this ongoing struggle to 
(re)define the relationship between politics and the rule of law, security professionals play an 
increasingly important role both in the definitional process of the security threats and the design 
of the counter-security-threat policies (Tsoukala, 2008a, 2008c). Their growing involvement in 
arenas that till recently were reserved for politicians and judges has in turn entailed a gradual 
change in the nature of the loci of the protection of human rights. Parliaments and Courts cease 
to be the sole natural definers and protectors of human rights for the benefit of the law 
                                                      
15 Although in some cases protection of the values they referred to was relative, it was admitted that these 
values were accepted as fundamental by the international community (Hoffman, 2004: 934). It was also 
acknowledged that some fundamental human rights were ‘non-derogable even in extreme emergencies’ 
(Tushnet, 2007: 276). 
16 As happened, for example, during the implementation of the so-called US extraordinary rendition 
programme.  14 | ANASTASSIA TSOUKALA 
 
enforcement agencies. Whether it takes the form of a corporatist force that seeks to defend its 
own interests, a closely interconnected web of domestic and international police and intelligence 
agencies that claim their expertise in the name of the specific knowledge they possess while 
eluding democratic control (Bigo, 2008b; Bonelli, 2008b), a domestic and/or international 
consultancy that seeks to promote ideological schemes and bureaucratic interests, or a 
communication strategy, the influence of the police and intelligence officials in the defining of 
security-related issues and, consequently, of human rights is sharply on the rise. 
In this dense interplay between politics, law, law enforcement, media and civil society, where 
value systems are constantly (re)defined according to an array of domestic and international 
interests and priorities, the place accorded to human rights can never be taken for granted. The 
present restrictions on the latter could have been expected, to the extent they are one of the 
possible outcomes of political and bureaucratic games in the post-bipolar political and security 
arena of liberal democracies (Alexander, 2002: 1157ff). Indeed, if we assume, along with Lloyd 
Weinreb (1987: 156), that “every significant liberty, conceived as a right, alters the natural 
distribution of powers”, it is plausible to assume that the (re)positioning of the key actors 
involved in the political and security fields of Western liberal societies would, among other 
things, imply the redefining of the relationship among them and between them and the people. 
Following the same reasoning, the institutionalisation of the control of deviance could be seen 
as foreseeable, to the extent that its targets may be understood as “impersonated embodiments 
of the otherwise vague and scattered, but daily and commonly suffered fears and nightmares” in 
an era of increasing uncertainty and insecurity for the future (Bauman, 2002: 60). Yet, arguably 
again, these restrictions on human rights would not have been so rapidly introduced and 
legitimised if personhood and legal personhood had not already been eroded by the 
longstanding spread of the risk-focused mindset in both the criminal justice and human rights 
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